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Abstract
The Apollo 13 incident and subsequent oxygen tank redesign for
Apollo 14 placed unique requirements on the flight support activity.
A major part of this activity was the integration of the various ana-
lytical efforts into a single team function. Additionally, the first
flight of the redesigned system without an orbital test required an
extensive analytical base.
The support team philosophy, objectives, and organization are pre-
sented. Various analytical tools that were used during the flight are
discussed. Investigations made during the post-flight period are con-
sidered and their impact upon subsequent flights shown.
Introduction
There are three major phases of work involved in any flight: pre-
flight, real-time, and post-flight. Because of the cryogenic oxygen
system redesign required, those three phases all had their own unique
situations and problems which tended to impact each other in more than
a normal manner. For this reason, all three phases will be discussed
herein--with the preflight discussions being limited to a functional
relationship. The paragraphs following introduce the phases.
During the Apollo 14 redesign effort, large contingents of analy-
tical resources were applied to the problem of designing, fabricating,
and testing a-new cryogenic oxygen system. To provide for adequate
communications between the various analytical groups involved, a team
approach was thus used. Informal meetings were held during this
period so that the team members could present the results of their
work and receive feedback to apply to their analyses. As in all
flight related programs, the major problem encountered during this
effort was the integration of the analyses into the hardware and oper-
ational areas. The solutions to this problem are discussed herein and
the various end items are presented.
In general, the end result of the analysis effort was a flight
support team trained and equipped to respond to the real-time needs
of the flight. For example, during the flight, there were several
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real-time problems that were faced and solved by the team members.
Obviously, the training and tools that were used during this time
had to be developed prior to the flight. These problems and the
methods of solution used will also be discussed.
Once the flight was over, the last phase of work was started--
post-flight analysis. For Apollo 14, this was a major task since it
basically became a new system evaluation. Therefore, the various
items analyzed during this portion of the work are presented to illus-
trate the requirements for basic system understanding.
The conclusions reached from the three phases of work are pre-
sented as concluding remarks to this paper.
Support Team
Pre-Flight
During this effort, there were some twelve identifiable organiza-
tional elements involved on the analysis team. The overall coordi-
nation of the team was the responsibility of the Power Generation
Branch of the Propulsion and Power Division. The major problem faced
by the team was that of communications; as mentioned earlier, perio-
dic team meetings were held to facilitate the necessary cross-ferti-
lization between the various efforts.
Since the fan-motors were deleted from the oxygen tanks, the
thermal performance of the heater depends to a large extent on the
net gravity level. Even though the artificial gravity levels are
normally extremely low, natural convection is the predominant mode of
heat transfer from the heater to the fluid. Obviously the conditions
that dominate these convective processes could not be duplicated in
a terrestrial environment; therefore, the adequacy of the design had
to be certified by analysis. This then became the major activity
of the team: that of insuring that the proposed system would be
adequate for the Apollo 14 mission.
There were two main items of interest with respect to the thermal
performance of the heater:
1. Maximum temperature reached by the structure (i.e., pressure
vessel and heater) during the mission.
2. Maximum expected pressure drop created by stratification
effects during the mission.
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These items were formally closed prior to the mission with a certi-
fication document which contained a condensation of the Analysis
Team's findings.
Flight Support
The end result of the analytical effort was to equip the flight
support team with the knowledge and resources to make real-time
inputs. Figure 1 presents the overall organization that the team
functioned under, and as can be seen these activities were concen-
trated in a support building complex adjacent to the Mission Control
Center.
The purpose of the cryogenic support team was to provide a con-
tinuous monitoring, analysis, and reporting activity of the cryogenic
system. The prime objective of this team was the early detection,
evaluation, and reporting of problems or potential problems. A
secondary objective was the continuous monitoring, analysis, and
reporting of routine system performance.
The general philosophy that was used during the organization of
this team was that only those problems that were amenable to rapid
solutions could be worked. This restriction had to be observed since
a large scale investigation by this team would have destroyed the
monitoring capability and left the system vulnerable to additional
failures. When problems arose that required large scale efforts,
separate teams were called to supply the manpower. In general, the
location and organization of these teams were functions of the nature
of the particular problem that had to be solved.
The detailed organization of the support team is shown in Figure
2. As can be seen in this figure, the flow of information was basic-
ally through the Subsystem Manager's position in the Mission Evalua-
tion Room (MER). As was mentioned earlier, the prime function of the
team located in the Backup Support Room (BSR) was that of system
monitoring. The procedure used to insure that this was done was to
manually plot some thirteen parameters from the real-time displays.
This then became the prime data source for the real-time analytical
support effort. The required frequency of plotting depended largely
upon the system performance. During early parts of the mission,
heater cycles occurred at rates of three to four per hour and thus
virtually continuous plots were required. Later, when the cycles
lengthened, the data points were plotted in about ten minute inter-
vals. This plotting served two purposes:
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1. Provided a continuous record of flight performance.
2. Forced an individual to examine the system trends on a rather
continuous basis.
As backups to the real-time data, the following items were available
to the team:
1. TWX summaries of the flight data on irregular intervals.
2. Polaroid pictures of the displays on ten minute intervals.
3. Tab outputs and plots available on about a twelve-hour turn
around basis.
The performance of this support system was such that many real-
time inputs were made to the operations team. This type of support
team activity was found to be a good solution to the problems of fast
response and continuous system surveillance.
In-Flight Analysis
Check Valve Leakage
The first problem noted during the flight was that of a check
valve leaking into tank number two. As can be seen in Figure 3, when
tank number three's pressure rose, tank number two's pressure would
track it. This meant that fluid from tank three was being forced back
into tank two. This problem did not affect the overall mission since
no fluid was being lost; however, it did affect the cryogenic manage-
ment and the eventual conduct of the Detailed Test Objective (DTO).
The problem was that as the fluid was forced into tank two, heat
energy was also transmitted--thus changing the effective thermal per-
formance of the tank. This would in time affect the individual tank
quantity schedule that had been planned prior to flight.
In order to solve this problem, the team members of the Mission
Performance and Analysis Division (MPAD) were called upon. The
program that they had written prior to flight was modified to include
this additional heat and mass transfer into tank two, and the mission
quantity schedules were recomputed. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
resulting predictions came very close to the actual flight quantities.
It was concluded from this analysis that the leaking check valve
would cause no problems during the remainder of the flight and that
the DTO could be conducted without modifying the cryo schedule.
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Heater Temperatures
The second problem found early in the flight was that the heater
temperatures recorded were consistently higher than expected. In order
to solve this problem, team members from the Boeing Company, TRW
Incorporated, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, North American Rockwell,
Structures and Mechanics Division (SMC), and MPAD were called upon.
The temperature limit of the components inside the pressure
vessel was set prior to flight to be 500°F based upon the autoignition
temperature of teflon of 7000 F. This margin is consistent with
margins on flammable materials used in the Command Module. The
pressure vessel itself is limited to 2000F based upon fracture mechan-
ics considerations. Preflight analysis indicated that with a maximum
heater temperature of 5000F the pressure vessel wall never exceeds
this limit. It was known prior to flight that there would be large
temperature gradients along the heater and it was felt that the tem-
perature sensor would reflect the temperature of one of the cooler
areas of the heater. Using this rationale a limit of 200°F was placed
upon the heater sensor indication.
Due to drawing and design changes, the temperature sensor was
mislocated in the model by 1.0 to 2.0 inches. This position error
occurred at a location where the temperature gradients were as large
as 100°F to 300°F per inch. After this was discovered, it was noted
that the sensor should and did reflect close to the maximum tempera-
ture on the heater. This is shown in Figure 5.
Next, it was found that at various times the heater temperature
could lead the sensor indication by as much as 50°F. This was deter-
mined by performing a transient analysis of the sensor and heater
system.
Using these analyses, it was determined that a safe heater tem-
perature limit could be established as follows:
1. Heater upper limit 500°F
2. AT between sensor and maximum point -50°F
3. Sensor Lag -50°F
4. Contingency for instrumentation -50°F
and analytical errors
5. Final Redline Limit 3500°F
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Using this rationale, a corrected maximum temperature limit of
350 F was established for the remaining portion of the mission.
Detailed Test Objective Simulation
In view of the new heater temperature work that was done, it was
decided to perform the high flow rate test using two heater elements
in tank number three (the low density tank). Since all the prior
analysis had been performed using three heater elements, the team mem-
bers of The Boeing Company were called upon to recompute the high flow
test predictions. This work was completed prior to the time that the
test was to be run, and formed a complete basis for the test monitor-
ing.
The predictions for tank number three along with the test data
are shown in Figure 6. As can be seen, the data fell close to the
trends predicted. In general, these predictions were such that the
support team was able to distinguish between two heater element and
three heater element operation.
Real Time Calculations
During the flight, there were many calculations made in an effort
to ensure satisfactory system operation. The majority of these cal-
culations involved various methods of establishing the system's
thermal performance. Heat leaks were calculated using flow rate aver-
ages with the heater off, pressure change rate with the heaters off,
and pressure change rate with the heaters on. In general, very little
success was obtained using any of these methods to calculate the heat
leak. Some of the problems involved with these calculations are as
follows:
1. Flow Rate Determination - Since the system does not have
individual flow meters for each tank, the flow sharing characteristics
must be implied using pressure data, thermal data, and intuition.
These methods all leak to large errors when using the resultant flows
to calculate heat leaks.
2. Pressure Change Rate - The major problem with this calcula-
tion is that the pressure data has a 4 psi bit granularity. This
means that a given value of pressure may be as much as 4 psi in error.
If the total span of a given cycle is 30 psi, it can be seen that this
pressure error represents a very large deviation.
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3. System Equilibrium - Since these systems are vapor cooled
the thermal performance is a strong function of the flow rate demanded
and therefore the flow-sharing characteristics. If a tank has been
supplying a large part of the load (i.e., high flow), its vapor
cooled shield will be colder than normal. The calculated heat leak
into the pressure vessel will then be abnormally low while at the same
time another tank will appear abnormally high.
4. Quantity Balance - Finally, with the three tank system, the
quantities may be separated by 30% to 40% and each tank will have a
different performance based upon its particular fluid state. These
heat leaks might at any one time range from 45 Btu/Hr to 20 Btu/Hr.
Post-Flight Analysis
The prime objective of a post-flight analysis is to establish
the limits of system performance and to apply these limits to the
future Apollo flights. A secondary objective is to reexamine the
flight data in detail to insure that no unexplained events go unde-
tected. This type of analysis is done on each flight; however, on
Apollo 14, a more detailed analysis than normal was required.
One major decision that had to be made using post-flight analysis
was whether or not to install an external recirculation pump on
Apollo 15. The various issues involved in this analysis were strati-
fication, quantity gauging accuracy, pressure decay due to stratifi-
cation, heater temperature limits, crew activity, and extra vehicular
activity capability. The data indicated that the quantity gauging
accuracy and pressure decays were about the same as those observed
on prior flights. As shown in Figure 7, all the observed heater
temperatures were within the expected bounds while achieving the
demands of Apollo 14. Also, it can be seen that by observing the
limits established by this figure, the crew work load could be mini-
mized. Prior ground testing indicated that the system could be opera-
ted in the blow-down mode below 20% quantity. Using this data, it was
decided that the pumps would not be installed on Apollo 15.
The next major task that was undertaken was to compile a set of
data on magnetic computer tapes so that the data could be accessed,
used, and plotted. Some thirty-four parameters were stored on these
tapes. These included five tank quantities, five tank pressures,
five fluid temperatures, three heater temperatures, two bus voltages,
three fuel cell currents, six fuel cell flow rates, one environmental
control system flow rate, one surge tank pressure, one cabin regulated
supply pressure, one cabin pressure, and one oxygen tank manifold
pressure. These data were plotted in one second intervals on the Cal-
Comp plotter and then distributed to the various team members.
Finally, there were several short studies performed to make sure
that the system had performed properly. These studies and their pur-
poses are as follows:
1. Calculated vs Measured Quantities - Using -the observed fluid
temperatures and pressures in combination with thermodynamic data,
densities were calculated. These densities were then used to cal-
culate quantities which are shown compared to the indicated quantities
in Figure 8. It should be noted that as the critical region is
approached (30% to 50%), this method becomes more inaccurate; however,
at the extremes, the method is consistent. This method of quantity
determination is shown to be an acceptable backup if it is needed.
Also, as part of this effort, these values were compared with Apollo's
11, 12, and 13 to establish the performance of the redesigned sensor.
As can be seen in Figure 9, the new sensors are not as accurate as
those that were on the old tanks. This was anticipated since the new
location of the sensor removes it from initmate contact with the
fluid.
2. Tank Energy Balance - This study was performed to establish
the overall system energy balance at various times during the mission.
This was done to establish whether or not stratification would affect
the thermal efficiency of the system. Figure 10 presents the data
calculated at various points in the mission. It should be noted that
nearly all the data falls within a ten percent band. This is felt to
be a remarkable accuracy, considering all of the variables that affect
the problem. Also, it is seen that the scatter is random in nature--
indicating little or no loss in overall thermal efficiency.
3. Pressure Response Study - This work was performed so that the
control characteristics could be established. This information will
be used on future flights to aid in system monitoring. During this
effort, there were two types of curves developed: heater on time and
total cycle time. The results of the tabulation for heater on time
are shown in Figure 11. As can be seen in this illustration, exact
trends are difficult to observe. Again, this is indicative of a
system with many operational variables. The total cycle times are
shown in Figure 12; again, exact trends are hard to establish. But,
the ranges of times that can be expected for future flights can be
observed and also the variation of trend with quantity can be roughed
out.
For Apollo 14, there are other analysis efforts that have been
done or are in progress. These efforts are very detailed in nature
and were in part reported in the other papers. Specifically, these
include studies of the "g" levels during various portions of the
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flight, the heat transfer characteristics of the heater under a
variety of conditions, and detailed stratification studies. These
studies are not part of normal post-flight evaluation but are typical
of those studies that are performed to evaluate specific events of
interest.
Conclusions
The system performed basically as was predicted prior to flight
and the analytical modes were verified in real-time. In the one
case of error--heater temperature--the problem was found to be pri-
marily erroneous heater temperature location input to the model.
It can be concluded that a support team can be organized to
respond to real-time flight problems if the members are (1) opera-
tionally checked-out and (2) analytical tools are prepared in advance.
A corollary to this is that such a large and rather complex team is
necessary and can be organized and successfully managed to solve
problems of the magnitude of the Apollo 14 cryo system redesign--all
in a relatively short time period. Also, it was noted that the
parallel nature of many of the studies provided a cross-check of the
analytical methods used.
From a technical standpoint, the conclusions are specific and are
as follows:
1. The leaking check valve on tank two had little effect on
system performance.
2. Large thermal gradients exist on the heater--with the speci-
fic temperature profiles being a strong function of gravity level.
3. The location of heater temperature sensors is a critical item
on flight systems.
4. The system successfully passed the high-flow test (DTO).
5. The tank quantities can be reasonably calculated from temper-
ature and pressure readings and can be used as a backup to direct
quantity readout.
6. Stratification does not affect the thermal efficiency (energy
balance) of the system.
7. Tank heat leaks cannot be calculated using present in-flight
data.
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8. External pumps are not required on Apollo 15.
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